I. INTRODUCTION
Uses of sensing based Internet of Things (IoT) applications have been expanding rapidly in many fields such as factory and building automation, environmental monitoring, health care, and in a wide variety of consumer and military application areas. Advancements in micro electro-mechanical systems and wireless communication have motivated the development of small and low power sensors and radio equipped modules that are replacing traditional wired sensor systems. These modules can communicate with each other by radio to receive and transmit data, and form networked embedded systems. Hence sensing based IoT applications have shown much promise to become a driver of current and future cyber physical system design. Currently, researchers are developing various types of software applications at different protocol level of IoT. Implementation of sensing applications is usually done using mostly battery powered micro sensing platform. In academia, researchers use operating systems, such as TinyOS [14] , Contiki [6] , ZigBee [3] stack etc., whereas industry uses their proprietary stack to develop applications in IoT devices.
Developing IoT applications in micro-sensing device is a challenging task, because most of the available sensor nodes (also called "motes") on the market (such as MTM-CM5000-MSP [17] ,TelosB [26] and others) have tight constraints on computation and communication resources.
Moreover, data sensitive applications like bio-medical sensing, industrial automation, military applications and others require stringent commitment of data and key security. It is fundamental that traditional sensor networks should have the capability to avoid eavesdropping, injection and modifications of packets [11] . If a suitable security capability is not available the efficiency and reliability of the network will be decreased [27] . Hence, security services like authentication and key management are crucial to IoT applications. To enforce security in IoT applications, security services and protocol based on PKC (such as SSL, IPsec, etc.) are widely used. For example, PKC is employed to bootstrap symmetric session keys and also to authenticate messages between sender and receiver. Traditionally, protocols and algorithms based on public key require extensive computation resources which are not typically available in IoT sensing platforms.
Traditional key agreement protocols allow parties to agree on a secret key at beginning of each communication session. The communication channel is assumed to be insecure. To this end, the parties exchange messages and use local secret values. However, the adversary is able to read and modify the messages that are transmitted through the channel. There are two different types of adversary: and also forges the honest sender to the honest receiver. Therefore, each honest party falsely assumes that it has established a secret key to the other.
Note that using a shared "network secret key" fails to provide security. If one node is corrupted by the adversary then the adversary will have access to this shared secret and the security of the entire network will be compromised [30] . We can't rely on a solution with fixed shared pairwise secret keys since this approach is not efficient, dynamic or scalable. Therefore, we need a scalable and efficient solution that enables any node to establish a secure channel to another entity without a pre-shared key or interaction with a third trusted center. In addition and to prevent MITM attacks, each party needs to authenticate the other and establish a secret key that is private from all other nodes (with possible exception of a root/master node).
Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocols are designed to address this issue. However, the computational and communication complexity of such protocols is considerable especially in constraint environments. Communication complexity is often measured in the number of messages exchange between parties. On the other hand, computation complexity is measured in the most time consuming operations. AKA protocols usually rely on public key cryptographic operations to be scalable. Therefore the number of exponentiation or similar operations is the measure of computation complexity. However, research has shown that communication complexity has a more prominent impact on battery consumption than computation. Therefore, the fewer message exchanges the better a protocol performs.
A one-pass AKA protocol is a key agreement protocol where the initiator only sends one message (however long) to the responder and both parties are able to compute a session locally using the transmitted message and internal secret values. This type of AKA protocols finishes only in one round. If there are two rounds involved we call such a protocol a two-pass protocol. [13] mentions that protocols which rely on using long-term static keys based on the difficulty of the discrete log problem to achieve a session key are insecure against K-CI attacks.
In this work, we consider only one-pass AKA solutions. This is due to the computational and communication restrictions on the IoT devices. Therefore, we can only achieve MITM and K-KS security against an active adversary. We argue that this is a valid assumption since in IoT applications often the devices are too limited in their computation and communication power and expensive solutions that provide higher security are too demanding. Thus, it is considered the best to protect a party's long-term private key than implementing costly protocols that offer security in situations where the long-term private key is compromised. In fact, in IoT applications, MITM attacks are more serious issues since an attacker can easily impersonate a valid mote of a network and recover all messages sent and received from that node. Thus, our goal is to design and implement a secure AKA protocol with low power consumption footprint for resource-limited sensor nodes. We then measure execution time and power consumption of our proposed method. We argue the feasibility of adapting our AKA protocol in various applications that rely on constraint devices. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is chosen since among PKC solutions for the same level of security, it requires smaller key sizes. Hence, ECC solutions can reduce memory and power consumption while providing an acceptable level of security.
II. RELATED WORK
Contiki ( [7] ) is an open source, portable and event-driven Real-Time OS(RTOS) for memory- Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is a public key encryption scheme where the public key is generated using the identity of the entity ( [2] ). IBE requires a master public/private key. This pair of keys is generated by a master entity known as Private Key Generator (PKG). Anyone can compute the public key of an entity given their ID and the master public key. However, only PKG can compute any entity's private key. IBE is used to prevent MITM attacks.
However, the idea of using IBE in WSN isn't new (e.g., [20, 28, 29, 5, 24] ). Oliveria et al. in [20] implement ECC pairing that leads to establishment of long term secrete keys. In contrast, this work examines authenticated secure communication session establishment in Contiki with timing as well as power consumption experiments. In this work we demonstrate the computational and power consumption impact of our IBE-ECC-based protocol in Contiki sensors with TinyECC as the main library. We demonstrate the performance of our protocol in this setting. To the best of our knowledge, there is no efficient IBE-based work for authenticated session key agreement in WSN. In this work, not only we propose an efficient and secure IBE based AKA protocol but also we perform time and power consumption analysis of our implementation.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We have an elliptic curve with parameters P, a, b, p, g, h where p is the prime modulus and g is the order of P which is a point on the elliptic curve constructed by a, b. For more on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) refer to [9] . h is any secure hashing function of appropriate digest size.
To provide dual authentication in our protocol we will rely on a specific class of encryption, Identity Based Encryption (IBE). In IBE the public key of any user is tied to their identity. Therefore, any node can compute the public key of another node locally as long as the receiver's ID is known and the sender has access to a master public key. In this setting, there is a dedicated entity (e.g., master node or PKG) that generates a pair of master public and private key. Any node's public/private key is computed using the master keys and the node's identity.
A simple IBE-ECC encryption scheme is demonstrated below. We assume that the master entity has generated an array of random integers with appropriate size (Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n). This array is the private key of the master entity. Consequently, the master public key will be an array Y where for each element we have Yi = XiP using ECC point multiplication. The master public key is published public key or pre-programmed in any node's memory.
For a node of ID "str", the Master node can calculate its private key (random integer Xstr ) and public key (random point of the curve, Ystr ) as follow:
.Xi where hi represents the i th bit value of the output of function h and
Note that to compute any node's public key, only its identity ("str") and the master public key is required. In our approach we use the work of Tan et.al. from [25] .
If party A wants to talk to party B then A reaches out to obtain B's public key (YstrB). A sends to B in plaintext a random number, r. Since we use an IBE-ECC as the underlying public key scheme then parties need not to exchange their public key to establish a secure session. Each party computes the public key of the other party locally. Therefore, MITM attacks are prevented. The use of a random r ensures that the generated key belongs only to the current session. Below we present our 1-pass AKA protocol. We assume that the parties can compute each other's public key locally and store them temporarily in memory for the sake of AKA execution. This means that all parties have the master public key stored in their memory. 
ID(A)||ID(B)||string( t EncKey t ).
5. Compute the MAC key as Km = HMAC(Kr, r||saltm) where saltm is publicly known. We can assume that for a pair A, B we have saltm =
ID(A)||ID(B)||string( t MacKey t ).
The security of our AKA solution can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 Assuming security of prior building blocks, the above protocol is secure against an eavesdropper.
Proof 1 (Proof sketch)
We sketch the security of the above protocol using the work of [1] .
In [1] As for complexity analysis of the above protocol, the dominant computational operation is elliptic curve multiplication (in line 2). However, we note that this computation can be carried out in advance and the result (Q) can be stored in memory to be used for future session establishment. As for communication complexity, we observe that only one message is sent (in line 1). The size of this message depends on the size of ID and size of r. We advise against re-using r and therefore the size of r should be proportional to the logarithm of the total number of sessions that will be established between a pair of nodes. In our implementation we used 32 bits for size of r.
a. Data Integrity Tag Segmentation
Data integrity and message authentication is essential to data security. For any message before being sent in an insecure channel, we compute HMAC (hash message authentication code) and append it to the original message. We use the approach of Encrypt Communication consumes considerable amount of energy, thus the fewer packages sent the longer the battery can last. One solution would be to postpone message integrity check. In this approach, for every M messages sent, one tag is computed and sent. It requires to maintain all M pack ages in memory at both sender and receiver. In addition, the integrity of a message is checked at a later time. This carries a risk that the receiver may act on a corrupt message only to discover later that the package was modified. This is another trade-off between security and cost (power consumption). The value of M is, therefore, critical. This value depends on the size of payload that is exchanged between two nodes in an IoT network.
We note that the payload size is often smaller than the encryption block size (AES's block size is 16 bytes). If the payload size (PL) is less than the block size (BL = 16 in bytes) then we set M = BL/PL Otherwise we set M = 1. We then define the message expansion rate (MER) as the ratio of total sent message including integrity tag versus message size with no integrity. This ratio indicates the overhead associated with message integrity. If we follow the segmentation rule above regarding M and indicate hash digest size with HD with encryption in counter mode then we have:
Note that the overhead shown above is less than the overhead with no integrity segmentation (MER = 1 + HD/PL). In fact, the reduction is 100(M − 1)/M percent. This reduced overhead also depends only the hash digest size since encryption block size is constant. In our experiment, we used payloads of size PL = 4 bytes and therefore M = 4 and MER was reduced by 75 percent.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implement the proposed authenticated session key agreement protocol on Contiki platform. We use TinyECC ( [15] ) as a software package for ECC-based operations. TinyECC is intended for TinyOS operating system and is implemented in nesC, but was converted to be used with Contiki in C. TinyECC supports SECP 128-bit, 160-bit, and 192-bit elliptic curve domain parameters. It supports all elliptic curve operations over Fp, such as point addition, doubling, and scalar point multiplication. We conducted our experiments with TMote Sky, ultra-low power wireless sensor nodes. TMote Sky is equipped with The TI MSP430, a family of ultra-low power micro-controllers. This device features a 16-bit RISC CPU, 2 16-bit timers, and constant generators that contribute to maximum code efficiency. We utilized some additional features in this work such as the Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART), Watchdog Timer, and two 16-Bit Timers. We also utilized Cooja, a Contiki simulator ( [21] ). We tested our protocol on a simple application where if the sender's light sensor value passes a predefined threshold, the light value will be encrypted with a tag and sent to the receiver, in which the receiver will turn on or off its LEDs. The authors are not aware of any previous work that implements a one-pass AKA protocol in the above setting. Therefore, a comparison of experimental evaluations with related work is not possible currently. hash and two cases of SHA). We set the AES key size to 128 bits as it provides 64 bits of security (due to birthday attack) and is a common choice for a lot of devices including IoT devices. We use counter mode for our encryption as it is a fast, secure and a common mode for
IoT encryption applications. We also assumed node discovery was done and each sender node knows the RIME address of the receiver. seconds. In Contiki, CTimer is also a 16-bit counter that is configurable to increment based on CLOCK CONF SECOND, which must be a power of two. Using the Tmote Sky, CLOCK CONF SECOND is setup to be 128, which means the CTimer counter will increment every 7.8125 milli-seconds and the counter will overflow after approximately 8.53 minutes.
Depending on the function, using RTimer may not be the best option to capture the execution time due to chances of the timer counter overflowing. Instead, both CTimer and
RTimer were used to see the difference. Using the compiler directive DEBUG TIME, it will compile the code that will output the execution time for a particular function. The compiler directive is used because of the additional code size and is only useful when gathering statistics.
DEBUG TIME will compile two additional functions start statTimer() and stop statTimer().
statTimer() will store the initial timer values of CTimer and RTimer by using Contiki built-in functions clock time() and RTIMER NOW(). After the initial timer values are stored, the function that we want to gather execution time will be executed, at the end stop statTimer() will be called which will compute the difference between the initial timer values with the current timer values, and print out the statistics.
Execution time for each function was measured using CTimer and RTimer. As an example, the function for computing the receiver's public key took 177/128 = 1.3828125 seconds by using CTimer, but with RTimer it calculated to be 45287/32768 = 1.3820495
seconds, which has more precision. In this case it is more useful to use RTimer. But, when looking at the function for generating the common secret in 1passAKA), it is useful to use
CTimer because RTimer will wrap around, while CTimer will maintain the correct elapsed time. Table b . shows approximate execution time for each method of our 1passAKA handshake protocol using the above measurement method. Figure 1 , shows the total amount of execution time it took for each combination of parameters. We can see that the overall time for the protocol when an ECC curve of 192 bits is used is approximately 80 seconds. This is compared to a ECC curve of 128 bits which is approximately under 30 seconds.
c. Elliptic curve addition and multiplication
As it can be seen from table b., elliptic curve addition (in function RECV PUBLIC KEY which computes the public key of other node) and multiplication (in function COMMON SECRET which computes point Q on the curve) from our 1pass AKA protocol take the longest time. In fact, the overall execution time of our protocol is mainly dominated by COMMON SECRET function. Any improvement in these two underlying building blocks will improve the overall execution time significantly. We decided to run stress tests on these two operations and study their execution time further. We note that in our experiments we ported TinyECC library for all elliptic curve operations in Contiki. In order to accurately measure the power consumption, we utilized the 2400 series SourceMeter.
It allows a maximum of 1700 readings/second with a current range reading from 10A to 10pA. It can be programmed to be either a CCS (Controlled-Current Source) or a CVS (ControlledVoltage Source) along with measuring the current, voltage, and/or resistance that the circuit is experiencing. We used LabTracer 2.0 program in our experiments, which is made specifically for the SourceMeter. The SourceMeter was set to be a CVS (at 3 volts) and to measure the current and power consumed during operation. Power was calculated as the product of measured current and voltage. Our TMote Sky was supplied with power directly by the SourceMeter. The measurements were performed on both the sending node and the receiving node. As for the sender, there are two possible communication mode: blocking mode (keeps sending till it receives an acknowledgment from the receiver) or non-blocking (sends the message only once).
In addition, three elliptic curve parameters of 128r1, 160r1 and 192r1 were tested in our power experiments. CRC16 and SHA-1 were used in all cases. In all modes and parameters, the nodes started at idle, followed by the execution of our 1passAKA protocol. Then the nodes were idle for 611 a few seconds and finally the green LED was turned on to indicate the successful termination of the protocol. In this work, we designed an efficient one-message-round authenticated session key agreement protocol to provide data confidentiality and integrity in IoT applications. Execution time and power consumption of our protocol in various settings were measured. We implemented our procotol for Contiki OS with TinyECC as the ECC library. We noticed that the main time consuming task in our protocol is the elliptic curve computation. Any optimization in this area is left as future work. In particular, studying the efficiency of different ECC libraries such as
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